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Memory, and the Possibility of
Sympathetic Spectatorship
Amy Louise Wood
Figure 1: Pat Ward Williams, “Accused/Blowtorch/Padlock” (1986). Digital Image
©Whitney Museum of Art/Licensed by Scala/Art Resource, NY.
1 “There’s something going on here. I didn’t see it right away” reads the text. And so the
artist compels us to look closely. At the center of the piece, in a row, sit four panels of
photographs,  each bordered with a  wooden frame.  With more scrutiny,  it  becomes
clear that the four images are pieces of the same photograph. A black man is tied to a
tree. It is an image that is both grossly familiar—as the text says, “you’ve seen one
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lynched man, you’ve seen them all”—and strangely jarring. After all the man is not
hanging from a tree; he even appears to be still alive, as the tension in his legs suggests
he is bearing some of his own weight.
2 What the piece does not tell us is that this man, named Robert “Bootjack” McDaniels, 26
years old, was lynched in 1937 in Duck Hill, Mississippi. He was apparently a bootlegger
who, along with his compatriot, Roosevelt Townes, had been whipped and threatened
by local whites for his illegal activities. When a local merchant was murdered, the two
men became prime suspects and were arrested. As they were being led to the county
courthouse to stand trial, a mob of about 200 white men kidnapped them, took them to
a clearing in the woods,  beat them, and cut them with knives.  The mob then used
gasoline blowtorches on them to extract their confessions. Once satisfied, the mob shot
McDaniels to death and burned Townes alive. A third suspect, Everett “Shorty” Dorrah,
had been brought to the clearing to watch, before he was horsewhipped and ordered to
leave the state.1
Figure 2: Robert “Bootjack” McDaniels, April 13, 1937
3 A local photographer documented this sequence of events and sold selected images out
of his studio in Grenada, Mississippi. These images, which include the one in Figure 2,
as well as another of Townes hogtied to a tree, differ from the conventions of most
lynching  photographs  in  that  they  depict  the  torture  being  enacted,  rather  than
capturing its aftermath or even an interrupted or staged moment in the process. The
lynchers are not visible, as they are in many such photographs, in which mobs stood
proudly around their victims, but their presence is clearly felt in the tug of the chains
that bind McDaniels’ hands, pulling his body away from the tree. 
4 Some fifty years later, in 1986, African-American artist Pat Ward Williams used this
image  of  McDaniels  in  the  piece  shown in  Figure  1,  entitled,  “Accused,  Blowtorch,
Padlock.” Williams is  a conceptual  artist  who works in a variety of  media,  weaving
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together historical and autobiographical images that deal with memory and race in
America. Her work also impels viewers to physically and intellectually interact with the
art, which is what she wants us to do in encountering this piece.2 She has surrounded
the panels of photographs with a series of questions and statements that challenge not
only the lynching,  but the act  of  photographing it.  Her text asks,  “Did he take the
camera  home  and  then  come  back  with  the  blowtorch?,”  evoking  a  metaphorical
association between the camera and the weapon as instruments of violation.3 She also
contests  those  who would  exhibit such an  image  by  reproaching  Life  magazine  for
publishing  the  photograph,  which it  did  in  1937  and then again  in  1955  (the  page
number  she  gives,  p.  141,  refers  to  the  1955  publication),  and  suggests  that  Life’s
editorial  decision  was  ideologically  loaded  with  real-world  political  effects:  “Life
magazine published this picture. Could Hitler show pics of the Holocaust to keep the
JEWS in line?” In other words, publishing the image was a means of racial control. 
5 The form of Williams’ text, not only its content, expresses a sense of personal outrage.
The words are handwritten, scrawled and shaky, connoting not written language but
speech, and angry speech. It is a shouting voice, screaming to be heard above the power
of the violent image. And then the scrawl of text ends with “Somebody do something,”
written in the present tense, as if she asking the viewer to intervene in the scene or
respond in some way to what is happening in the photograph.
6 Several  things are happening in this  piece.  First,  Williams collapses any distinction
between the torturer and the act of photographing or even exhibiting an image of that
torture. Then, in her final statement, she collapses past and present. The torture is
ongoing; it exists in the present. These two points are related, since her text implies
that the continued existence of the photograph extends the victim’s torture. Moreover,
Williams  emphasizes  the  emotional  impact—the  affect—that  viewing  this  torture
produces.  That  affect,  as  manifest  in both the content  and the form of  the text,  is
visceral, and its physical intensity calls upon us to feel sympathy, as in to feel with or
alongside (sym-) the suffering (pathos) of another. Our sympathy is twofold; we are
horrified by the sight of the victim’s torture, but also we feel alongside the artist –in
fact, it’s her suffering that calls out to us directly.
7 ***
8 This piece is a memorial to lynching, to the horror of thousands of African Americans
tortured and killed throughout the Jim Crow era. Lynching has served as the primary
metaphor,  or  what  Leigh Raiford has  called  the  “primal  narrative,”  through which
African  Americans  have  interpreted  their  subjugated  status  in  the  US  and  have
responded to racial injustice in the present.4 If lynching is a primal metaphor, lynching
photographs have served as the visual symbols of that metaphor. As such, they have
the capacity to activate popular consciousness about racist violence in the past and
guide  public  discourse  about  it  by  producing  in  the  viewer  a  meaningful  ethical
engagement with that past, what many scholars have termed “bearing witness.”5 As
Ann Kaplan has argued, viewing another’s suffering becomes an act of witnessing when
one is so emotionally aroused by the scene that one is transformed to the point of
feeling “vaguely responsible” and thus motivated to act. Kaplan terms this emotional
response one of empathy, as the viewer imagines him/herself in the moment—though,
as I explain below, I prefer the term sympathy. An ethical engagement need not entail a
direct intervention, but can consist of a shift in perspective of the world and one’s own
responsibilities in it.6
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9 But what does it mean to bear witness to past atrocities? Can the spectatorship of a
historical image  of  racial  suffering  produce  a  sympathetic,  and  thereby  ethical,
engagement  with  present-day  injustice?  The  status  of  lynching  photographs  as
symbolic forms, as icons, I believe, opens up the possibility of such encounters. That
iconic  status  strips  the  photograph of  any  historical  specificity,  so  that  its  subject
comes  to  represent  something  greater  than  itself.7 Removed  from  history,  the
photograph remains ever-present, speaking to ongoing injustice and trauma. What’s
more, its iconic status renders the spectator’s relation to the image somewhat fluid.
New meanings can be imposed on an image through text, framing, and context, as well
through the viewer’s subjective positioning, all of which can potentially reposition the
spectator to stimulate an affective response, not only to the lynching victim, but to
those suffering in the present. In other words, lynching photographs can help create an
ethical historical memory of racial violence, engaging with the past to reflect upon the
present  and  demanding  a  reckoning  with  present-day  injustice.  This  is  what,  for
African Americans, Raiford has called “black critical memory,” an interpretation of the
past  that  forms  black  political  and  social  identities  and  mobilizes  social  justice
movements.8 But, I contend, lynching photographs also create the possibility of a white
sympathetic  encounter  with  the  historical  memory  of  lynching.  In  that  context,
Williams’  plea  for  “somebody  [to]  do  something”  in  the  face  of  Townes’  long-past
torture does not seem out of time or place.
10 By historical memory, I am referring to ideas that groups and individuals might hold
about past events that they never experienced or witnessed first-hand. These memories
are,  by  their  very  nature,  social.  For  one,  they  come  to  be  framed,  learned,  and
transmitted through groups and institutions in families,  schools,  museums,  and the
media—acts of transfer that make remembering possible at all. That is, there exists no
understanding or mental image of historical events outside social representations of
them. What’s more, social groups make decisions about what is memorable and what is
not, often to meet the needs and concerns of the present. In other words, historical
memories derive only from present-day social judgments about what is important to
apprehend and convey. The formation of historical memories is, to be sure, a contested
process, as whose memories come to dominate in the public sphere is dependent on
social power, and that process can also entail misremembering and even forgetting.
This is especially so in the context of histories of race and violence in the United States,
as  various  social  groups hold  very  different  memories  of  this  past,  which,  in  turn,
structure their responses to present-day racial violence.9 In particular, while for many
black Americans the memory of lynching is visceral and ever-present—that “primal
narrative”—for  many  white  Americans  it  is  hazy,  distorted,  or  forgotten.  Yet  that
misremembering can be disrupted through self-reflective acts of displaying and looking
at lynching photographs, much as Williams does in “Accused/Blowtoch/Padlock.” 
11 This paper will consider the creation of an ethical historical memory of racist violence
in the United States by tracing the exhibition history of the photograph of Bootjack
McDaniels’ torture and murder. It reflects on the ways in which text and context can
shape  affect  and,  in  turn,  sympathetic  engagement.  It  will  also  consider  public
responses to lynching photographs more broadly to argue that,  although black and
white spectators tend to respond to these photographs in different ways, whites can
engage  in  a  parallel  process  of  critical  memory  through  a  form  of  sympathetic
spectatorship.10
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12 ***
13 We are well aware today that a photograph is not a transparent or objective reflection
of  an  event;  that  is,  the  documentary  realism  of  photography  is  somewhat  of  an
illusion.  A photograph represents only a  snapshot of  time;  it  does not  tell  us  what
happened before and after the moment or what is happening outside the frame, nor
can it  capture  sound or  mood.  Yet,  despite  these  limitations,  photographs have an
unusual capacity to construct and transmit historical memories of an event, especially
so  with  acts  of  atrocity  such as  lynching.  That  capacity  is  undoubtedly  due  to  the
authority we bestow on photographs as objective records of the past. Unlike oral or
written accounts of the past, a photograph appears not to have a mediator, especially
as  the  subjective  position  that  is  inherent  in  any  photograph—the  eye  of  the
cameraperson—is concealed. The authority granted to a photograph is compounded in
instances  of  human  atrocity,  which  challenge  our  assumptions  about  imaginable
human behavior. Through its indexical function, the photograph provides the proof
that  violence demands;  we know that  this  event  took place because somebody was
there  to  capture  it  on  film.11 The  supposed  realism  and  immediacy  of  that  image
prompts an emotional response that sears itself into memory. Photographs of atrocity
can shock the viewer out of complacency—horrify, repel, and sadden. 
14 Indeed, rather than casting doubt on the past, the fact that photographs represent only
a  defined  moment  in  time  contributes  to  their  capacity  to  facilitate  historical
memories.  Those  memories  depend  on  some  sort  of  tangible  manifestation  that
condenses what is actually a complicated and ambiguous past into an accessible form
and brings conflicting group or individual recollections into a schematic, conventional
unity.12 Photographs stabilize the past into an unchanging and easily readable image,
what Susan Sontag has likened to a “quotation, or a maxim, or a proverb.”13 They have,
in that sense, what has been called an “iconic presence,” making present a moment
through representation that is otherwise lost to time. The “iconic presence” speaks also
to the aura around a photograph, through its  intrinsic association with death,  or a
moment lost in time, so they appear as a ghostly remnant of the past.14 In that sense,
photographs operate much like memory itself, bringing to life the past in a shadowy,
yet vivid—immediate, yet approximate—way. 
15 Many public responses to Without Sanctuary, a collection of over 100 photographs, many
of which were published in 2001 and have been exhibited in various cities over the past
eighteen years, attest to this authority that lynching photographs hold. In his forward
to the book, Without Sanctuary, Congressman John Lewis writes that, although as a child
growing up in Alabama he heard stories about lynchings, they “seemed nightmarish,
unreal—even unbelievable.” The photographs, however, “make real the hideous crimes
that  were  committed  against  humanity....  [and]  bear  witness  especially  since  many
Americans will not (don’t want to) believe such atrocities happened in America.”15 In
other words, photographs force an ugly truth on a reluctant and disbelieving public
and provide them a visual vocabulary through with which to comprehend this violence.
Viewers of the Without Sanctuary collection in various exhibitions across the country
and  online  have  recorded  similar  responses.  The  images,  viewers  claim,  offer  a
“realistic representation” of lynching, a “brutal truth and reality” that “burn[s] the
idea into our heads to remember.” They are “disturbing” and “bone-chilling,” yet “eye-
opening,” revealing the full scale of the horror for viewers. As one viewer posted, “I
knew our past was a horrible and dark time, but I never imagined it looked like this.”16 
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16 Yet these qualities of atrocity photographs are precisely what make them problematic
as  vehicles  for  historical  memory,  as  many  critics  have  pointed  out.17 As  Williams
makes clear in her piece, the violence represented in the image is bound up in the act
of photographing, a fact that heightens the sickening horror of the images. Lynching
photographs thus make an individual’s death—already horrific not only because of the
torture he suffered,  but  because that  suffering was made public  so casually—public
once again. The sensationalism of the image potentially renders the present-day viewer
a voyeur,  another  lynching spectator.  The lynching victim,  in  turn,  is  rendered an
anonymous icon, a representation of all black suffering, frozen in time, the effect of
which is to potentially reify black victimhood.18
17 What’s more, some have argued, repeated exposure to atrocity images can anesthetize
viewers  from  the  past  trauma  represented  in  them,  a  distancing  which  ultimately
produces  ethical  or  political  indifference.19 Encountering  the  images  in  the  quiet
comfort of a gallery or in the security of their homes, viewers are potentially offered a
screen  from  any  real  engagement  from  the  horror  of  the  moment.  And  the
representation of  the  event  ultimately  comes  to  replace  any  real  understanding  or
knowledge of it.  Instead, the images can feed a simplistic narrative of the past and
prompt conventional, predictable responses to it.20 
18 These challenges inherent in the exhibition of  atrocity photographs have led to an
impulse not to look, to remove the images from view.21 John Lewis has said that his wife
refuses to open the book version of Without Sanctuary.22 This same impulse can be seen
in the work of contemporary artists such as Kerry James Marshall and Ken Gonzalez-
Day, who, unlike Williams, have grappled with the relationship between memory and
lynching photography by recreating the images in their work, yet obscuring the bodies
of the dead in them.23 The National Memorial for Peace and Justice, which the Equal
Justice Initiative (EJI) opened in Montgomery, Alabama, in 2018 to commemorate the
victims of lynching, includes no photographs, to haunting effect. At the center of the
site is a large, semi-enclosed square containing 800 steel slabs, each representing 800
counties  in  which lynchings  were committed.  They are  suspended from the ceiling
frame, as if to resemble hanged bodies. Elsewhere on the six-acre lot, replicas of the
slabs are laid on the ground, lined up in rows, appearing like coffins. The omission of
photographs  was  intentional.  As  EJI  executive  director  Bryan  Stevenson  told  the
Montgomery Advertiser, “I think for some people ‘Without Sanctuary’ created this optic
that was shocking, and we were less interested in shocking optics.” The EJI wanted to
emphasize the communities in which this violence took place, rather than suffering of
individual victims.24 Indeed, the EJI will deliver to any county its slab to be displayed on
site as a memorial. In doing so, the hope is that communities will take responsibility for
their history, that is, to bear witness. Yet, would the EJI memorial be as evocative and
powerful as it is if viewers did not already know what a lynching looked like?
19 ***
20 The history of the Duck Hill photo can be instructive in formulating how to look at
lynching photographs in a way that leads to an ethical engagement with the historical
memory of lynching. Lynching photographs were detached from historical specificity
and rendered into  symbols  from their  very  first  appearances.  For  the  defenders  of
lynching, they could stand as representations of white supremacy and power over black
beastliness. For anti-lynching activists, they became symbols of white barbarism and
the  failure  of  American  democratic  ideals.25 As  a  photograph  moves  in  and  out  of
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different visual and ideological contexts, it comes to reflect the needs of a particular
moment in time.26 This was true of the photograph of Bootjack McDaniels’ lynching,
long before Williams used it in “Accused/Padlock/Blowtorch.”
21 In 1937, it was the first photograph of a lynching of a black man to be published in the
mainstream,  national  press.27 This  lynching  attracted  relatively  significant  national
attention at the time because it occurred just as the U.S. House of Representatives was
debating the passage of the Gavagan Bill,  a bill  that would make lynching a federal
crime, thereby allowing the federal government to place sanctions upon communities
in which a lynching took place. This bill, introduced by New York Congressman Joseph
Gavagan,  a  white  man  who  represented  black  Harlem,  was  one  of  many  similar
attempts to pass  anti-lynching legislation in the 1920s and 1930s.  The Gavagan Bill
passed the House 277-118, largely along sectional lines, a legislative victory that was
helped by the news of the Duck Hill lynching.28 Time magazine reported that, two days
before  the  vote,  debate  in  the  House  “rose  to  a  furious  crescendo”  after  one
representative read from a press report the details of the torture enacted upon Townes
and McDaniels.29 McDaniels and Townes were to stand in for all lynching victims at that
moment, and their lynching was the kind of atrocity an anti-lynching bill was meant to
punish. 
22 Soon  afterwards,  Life magazine  published  the  photograph  of  Bootjack  McDaniels’
tortured  body,  flanked  on  either  side  by  headshots  of  Congressmen  Gavagan  and
Hatton Summers (D-TX), the lead opponent of the bill, with the headline “One Lynching
Spurs  Congress  to  Stop  Others,”—a  positioning  meant  to  direct  the  viewers’
interpretation of not only the lynching photograph as one with high political stakes,
but also the bill itself: this is the kind of atrocity over which these men were battling.30 
Time magazine similarly published another photograph from the Duck Hill lynching,
one that showed both McDaniels and Townes, naked and hogtied to a tree, in the frame,
beside its story about the Gavagan Bill.31 Then, in December of that year, when the same
bill  was  being debated in  the Senate,  a  poster  that  included both images  appeared
outside the Senate chamber. It also was published in the Chicago Tribune amidst a series
of ads and a photograph of a black dance performance [see figure 3].32 Beyond brief
captions,  most  of  these  outlets  provided  few  details  about  the  lynching  itself,  or
McDaniels  and  Townes,  or  their  alleged  crime.33 But  to  serve  their  purpose,  these
images did not require context; they were meant to serve as a visual rallying cry to
garner  support  for  the  bill.  The  Memphis  Press-Scimitar, which  also  printed  the
photograph of McDaniels alone, did so “only in hope that it will cause such a feeling of
revulsion that there will never be another like it.”34 
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Figure 3: Chicago Tribune, 5 December 1937, H2
23 The press’s use of the Duck Hill photographs were very much in line with how the black
press and the NAACP had been using lynching photographs for years. Since Ida B. Wells
first printed an illustration of a lynching, rendered from a photograph, in her 1894
anti-lynching pamphlet, A Red Record,  activists had used lynching images to provide
visual  documentation to  a  potentially  disbelieving public  that  these  atrocities  were
happening,  and to  arouse “revulsion” in  viewers  as  a  means to  galvanize  the anti-
lynching movement. In doing so, they displaced these photographs entirely from the
local  circumstances  and  sentiments  that  had  produced  them.  The  authenticity  or
journalistic  specificity  of  the images were not  that  important  to  them. They rarely
offered any details about the victims, and provided little context for their murders.
Often one lynching photograph would be used in many different contexts,  with the
name and date of the victim erased from the images. The NAACP furthered this practice
when it  began publishing lynching photographs in its  newspaper,  the Crisis,  and in
various  anti-lynching  pamphlets  and  posters.  For  anti-lynching  activists,  the
photographs served as interchangeable symbols of white brutality and black suffering.
35 Their  efforts  substantiate  the  notion  that  the  meaning  of  a  photograph  is  not
intrinsic  to  the  image;  rather,  meaning is  created—an emotive  reaction produced—
through the ideological context in which it is viewed.
24 This  use  of  lynching photographs  fit  with  activists’  broader  rhetoric,  which placed
emphasis  not  on  black  victimhood,  but  on  the  depravity  of  white  mobs.  Lynching,
activists  tended  to  argue,  was  a  crime  not  so  much  against  black  communities  or
families but against American civilization and democracy. Their political rhetoric and
imagery made surprisingly little mention of race or racial prejudice. In fact, the black
victim—a too-visible reminder of black criminality—became largely eclipsed, while the
members of the mob, as defilers of justice and law, moved to the front and center of
anti-lynching  discourse.  These  editorial  decisions  appealed  to  white  liberals  and
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moderates who might harbor fears about black criminality, but who also believed in
law and order, and wanted to see America as a civilized and just nation. In that context,
it made sense not to provide readers with any details about the victims or the events
that allegedly precipitated the lynching. Photographs depicting only the lynched man’s
body  were  exceptional  in  the  black  press  for  that  reason;  editors  often  preferred
photographs that showed the surrounding mob.36 
25 Eighteen years later, in January 1955, the photograph of McDaniels’ lynching appeared
as part of the Family of  Man exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in New York,
organized  by  photographer  Edward  Steichen.  The  exhibition  included  a  large
assortment  of  images  from across  the  world  that  depicted  a  wide  array  of  human
experiences, and was accompanied by a book, also entitled Family of Man, which has
been in print ever since. The exhibit derived from a post-war liberal and modernist
impulse  that  sought  to  draw  connections  between  diverse  human  experiences as
universal experiences—to see, in Steichen’s words, “the essential oneness of mankind
throughout the world.”37 Ascribing authenticity to the photographic images, Steichen
imagined that photography could reveal essential human truths. Rather than pictorial
representations produced from distinct human subjectivities,  Steichen believed that
the  images  in  the  exhibition  could  act  as  direct  reflections  of  fundamental  human
realities, mirrors “of the universal elements and emotions in the everydayness of life.”
38 The exhibit was arranged thematically, beginning with photographs depicting love
and sexuality, progressing to birth, childhood, and other moments of celebration, and
then turning to darker moments of war, violence, and finally death. The photographs
were hung on the bare white walls of the museum with no context, on the assumption
that the images spoke for themselves.39
26 The  Duck  Hill  lynching  photograph  was  actually  removed  from  the  Family  of  Man
exhibition  soon  after  it  opened  and  did  not  appear  in  the  book.  The  image  was
apparently attracting too much attention, thereby disrupting the exhibition’s overall
theme of collectivity and universality. According to Steichen’s assistant at the time,
Wayne  Miller,  “the  theme  of  the  show  [would  be]  interrupted  by  this  individual
photograph…. the presentation [of the photograph] was dissonant to the composition.”
40 Indeed,  as  John Szarkowski  has  noted,  the  exhibit  was  designed  to  be  a  holistic
experience, in which all 500 photographs were to “speak with one voice.”41 Although
Steichen seemed more concerned with the impact of the photograph on the exhibition,
rather  than  on  the  prospective  viewer,  his  decision  to  excise  it from  the  show
acknowledged, on some level, that in 1955 lynching could not be reduced to a collective
human  experience,  and  that  to  display  such  an  image  within  the  context  of  this
exhibition was to diminish its horror. 
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Figure 4: Life Magazine, 14 February 1955. Henri Cartier-Bresson, “China,” ©Magnum
Photos; Yasuhiro Ishimoto, “Little Ones,” ©Kochi Prefecture, Ishimoto Yasuhiro Photo
Center; reproduced with permission. 
27 Before Steichen had the image permanently removed from the exhibition, however, Life
magazine chose to publish it as part of a Family of Man photographic essay in February
1955  in  conjunction  with  the  MOMA  exhibition.  Since  many  of  the  images  in  the
exhibition  had  been borrowed from Life’s  archives,  the  exhibition  was  as  much an
advertisement for Life  as the magazine’s photo-essay was a promotion for the show.
Besides its commercial ties to the collection, Life,  with a comfortable, white middle-
class readership of about six million, was a suitable venue in which to promote the
exhibition;  Steichen’s  vision  matched  Life’s  entire  moral  and  aesthetic  approach  to
news. In its introduction to the photo-essay, Life announced that the pictures portray
“the  emotions  which  all  members  of  the  human  family  share,  no  matter  in  what
country or at what stage of civilization they live,” anticipating that its viewers would
reflect upon the similarities and continuities between diverse human experiences.42
28 The  image  of  Bootjack  McDaniels’  tortured  body  appeared  on  a  two-page  spread,
entitled “Tensions Turn to Dread and Hate,” along with three other photographs: a
crowd scene before the Communists invaded Shanghai; a scene in which a young boy,
having  a  tantrum  in  suburban  Connecticut,  swings  a  board  at  his  mother;  and,
diagonally opposite the lynching photograph, a photo captioned, “Playtime Torment in
Chicago Park,” in which two white children are tied to a tree in some sort of game. [See
figure 4.] These images were not presented together in Steichen’s exhibition or in his
book; these juxtapositions were Life’s editorial decision. Through them, lynching, and
by extension ongoing racial conflicts in America, were conflated with Cold War anxiety
and postwar suburban unrest.
29 In placing the image of McDaniels’ torture with these other images, Life replaced its
original  racial  and  political  significance  with  another,  arguably  just  as  menacing,
ideological  meaning.  The  effect  of  this  placement  was  to  equate  otherwise
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incomparable experiences of human pain and suffering. Perhaps the juxtaposition of
two children tied to a tree in a game and a man being tortured to death was intended to
suggest an underlying terror in childhood play. Yet instead, the tragedy of lynching
was diminished,  rendered into another “domestic” conflict  with which Life readers,
largely white and middle-class, were meant to identify. 
30 The  caption  Life chose  for  the  photograph—“Death  Slump  at  Mississippi  Lynching,
1937”—also serves to unburden the image of its racist origins.  It  tersely relates the
time, place, and event so that the image comes to signify something much broader than
McDaniels’ lynching, becoming a generalized representation of suffering. The phrase
“Death Slump” is particularly jarring. The phrase directs the viewer’s response to the
image by reimagining the violence that is represented; in fact, it elides the violence.
The caption suggests the man is dead, but, as noted, a closer look reveals he’s not—
quite. “Slumping” and “death” do not connote murder, and certainly not torture, but
rather a spontaneous or natural loss of life. “He suddenly slumped over,” we might say.
Viewers in 1955 could read this caption and look at this image without absorbing the
knowledge that this man was being tortured to death. Any emotional impact of the
image is weakened, and viewers could remain comfortable in their own detachment
from injustice. Unlike the use of this photograph at the height of the anti-lynching
movement,  this  placement  entirely  disregarded  lynching  as  a  specific  historical
practice perpetrated against African Americans.
31 What is significant here, however, is not that the reprinting of the photograph itself
caused any numbing effect in viewers; rather, the context in which it is situated allows
viewers a voyeuristic glance while remaining disengaged. Yet the historical and social
position of the viewer also matters. After all, looking at this image in the present day,
viewers are likely to be horrified, not only by the photograph, but by Life’s seemingly
casual  editorial  decisions.  Perhaps  in  1955  viewers  would  have  been  able  to
immediately contexualize this image in the light of current racial conflicts—though this
photo-essay was released some seven months before the murder of Emmett Till and
about ten months before the Montgomery Bus Boycott.43
32 It  was  not  until  1986,  when  Pat  Ward  Williams  used  it  for  her  piece,  that  the
photograph of McDaniels’  lynching appeared again in a public setting. Williams has
stated in reference to this piece,  “I  raise the question of responsibility in the print
media… I ask the viewer to think about what he thinks when he sees this image. Is it
information  or  terrorism?”44 In  other  words,  the  photograph  provides  historical
evidence  of  an  act  of  terrorism  (i.e.:  it  is  information),  but  the  photograph  itself
functioned as  an instrument of  terror.  In  her  question,  and in the piece itself,  she
provokes viewers to become aware of their potential complicity in this act of terrorism
as spectators,  even consumers,  of  it.  Yet in protesting the exhibition of this image,
Williams herself makes a public presentation of it.  In order to transform the image
from an act of  terrorism to a protest against terrorism, she must shift  its  meaning
through her arrangement of the photograph, the text she attaches to it, and the spaces
in which she chooses to exhibit it. As one critic noted, her recontextualization rendered
her use of the photograph very different from “a member of the KKK finding the same
image and tacking it up on his wall.”45 In that sense, Life’s error, one that leads Williams
to accuse the magazine of terrorizing intent, was not that it published the photograph,
but that it did so in ways that did not detach the photograph enough from its original,
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white  supremacist  meaning,  or,  alternatively,  by  detaching  it  too  much  from  that
context.
33 Williams’ caption, “Accused/Blowtorch/Padlock,” directs the viewer’s response to the
four images of McDaniel’s lynching at the center of the piece, and, in doing so, replaces
the historical erasure of the Life caption. While the phrase “death slump” elided the
actions of the lynch mob, Williams places the emphasis back upon the perpetrators by
naming their  objects  of  torture.  The term,  “accused” could presumably function in
several  different  ways.  It  could  refer  to  McDaniels,  who  was  referred  to  as  the
“accused” in contemporary news accounts.46 But placed before the words “blowtorch”
and  “padlock,”  and  situated  alongside  her  accusatory  text,  the  “accused”  can  be
understood as the men who tortured McDaniels and took this picture, or Life magazine
that published it, or even the viewer gazing upon it. In that sense, her title forces a
moment of self-reflection on the spectator.
34 The scrawled words and the wooden, three-dimensional frames with which Williams
surrounds  the  images  also  direct  the  viewer’s  interpretation  of  those  images,
compelling us to share her horror at  the atrocity before us.47 Alluding to the term
“sound-bite,” one reviewer referred to these scratches of phrases as “word-bites” that
Williams supposedly borrowed from snippets of commentary she had read or heard
over the years.48 “Word-bites” aptly connotes violence and fury. Replacing “word” with
“sound” also describes our encounter with them; we do not hear them but read them,
as our eyes are compelled to pour over her words, much as they pour over the images.
The frames serve to separate the images from her text. One reviewer has likened the
frames to windows that allow viewers to enter into the experience of human suffering
in the images.49 Lucy Lippard,  similarly,  has argued that the window frames,  which
Williams has used in other works, compel us “to look through it and enter into the
picture’s reality.” These commentaries interpret Williams’ intention as similar to Life 
magazine’s presentation of the photograph. That is, the photo serves as an entry into
an experience of human suffering with which viewers are meant to empathize. At the
same time, Lippard says that the frames serve as a “distancing device,” suggesting that
viewers can remain inoculated against that suffering.50
35 It might actually be more useful to think of these frames not as window frames that
provide entries into shared human experiences, but as picture frames. As such, they
denaturalize the images of McDaniels’ tortured body and signify that they are pictorial
representations; that is, the images are constructed from a subjective and ideological
point of view—that of the lynch mob—which reminds us that the violence is bound up
in the photograph itself. The frames thus serve to highlight the conflation of the act of
torture and the act of representing or exhibiting that torture, and make viewers aware
that they are spectators of both. If the frames do distance viewers from the images,
they do so not to anesthetize them from McDaniels’ suffering, but, much as the text
does, to remind them of their own complicity in it. 
36 Williams’ arrangement of the images similarly makes conspicuous the links between
the act of lynching, the act of photographing the lynching, and the act of watching a
lynching.  Williams  had  divided  the  photograph  of  McDaniels’  lynched  body  into
individual  body  parts,  effectively  ripping  it  out  of  its  context  in  order  to
recontextualize  it.  The  division  also  replicates  visually  the  destruction  and
objectification of McDaniels’ body that the lynching itself enacted. The images literally
break McDaniels apart, just as the lynch mob did. As viewers, we are then forced to
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reenact  and  confront  the  essential  violation  of  this  torture.  The  close-up  shots  of
McDaniels’ body verify that it is indeed a human body that is being violated—a hand, a
torso, a neck, a face. The effect appears to be objectifying, but since it draws attention
to the mob’s objectification of McDaniels, the effect actually serves to re-humanize him.
In  challenging  the  viewer  in  these  ways,  Williams’  piece  does  not  allow  for  any
aesthetic distancing or voyeuristic complacency. 
37 Although Williams situates the photograph of McDaniels’ lynching firmly within the
history  of  racism  and  racist  violence  in  the  United  States,  the  piece  does  not
particularize this lynching. Viewers do not learn McDaniels’ name, when this happened
and where, or even what exactly is happening to him. Like the anti-lynching activists of
the early twentieth century, she renders McDaniels’ death into iconography. His death
is to stand in for all African-American suffering; his torturers for all white racism—
including ongoing racial violence in the 1980s. Certainly, this image would have had
particular  resonance  in  1986,  when  a  series  of  high-profile  crimes  against  African
Americans led many activists and political leaders to publicly declare racial violence a
rising problem.51 In 1982, a white gang had beaten Willie Turks to death in Brooklyn. In
1983, Michael Stewart was killed from blunt force trauma while in police custody in
New York after his arrest for spraying graffiti in a subway station. A NYPD officer shot
Eleanor Bumpers in her Bronx apartment in 1984.  That same year,  Bernhard Goetz
generated national controversy when he shot four black teenagers, paralyzing Darrell
Cabey permanently, after they approached him for money in the New York subway.
Many  white  Americans  hailed  Goetz  as  a  hero  for  his  vigilante  stand  against  the
purported  plague  of  black  crime,  while  others,  including  the  New  York  Police
Commissioner, likened his act to a lynching. In 1986, a group of white teenagers beat
and chased  three  black  men,  including  Michael  Griffith,  in  Howard Beach,  Queens,
forcing Griffith to run into traffic, where he was killed—an event New York mayor Ed
Koch  called  a  “modern  lynching.”52 The  sense  Williams  conveys  in  “Accused/
Blowtorch/Padlock”  that  the  lynching  of  McDaniels  is  happening  now, and  that
someone can intervene, was, therefore, not entirely theoretical or rhetorical.
38 These  events  all  happened  in  the  context  of  national  debates  over  hate  crimes
legislation that imposed harsher penalties on crimes committed due to racial or ethnic
bias. Many states began passing hate crime laws in the 1970s and 1980s, and the US
Congress  began  debating  the  first  federal  hate  crimes  legislation  in  1985.  As
Christopher Waldrep has argued, the difference between a lynching and a hate crime is
largely  semantic.  The  term  “hate  crime,”  however,  places  the  culpability  for  the
violence  on individual  perpetrators,  rather  than an entire  community,  as  the  term
“lynching” does. The effect on African Americans is nevertheless the same, for a hate
crime or  a  lynching both arouse  that  terrifying sense  of  racial  fear;  in  short,  they
terrorize.53 Williams’ use of the term “terrorism” is thus pointed in this context. And by
implicitly  directing  viewers  to  draw  connections  between  past  and  present-day
lynchings, she challenges the rhetoric of “hate crimes” to demand a sense of collective
white responsibility. 
39 At  the  same time,  Williams shows awareness  of  the  dangers  of  detaching lynching
photographs from history. “There’s something going on here. I didn’t see it right away.
After all, you see one lynched man you’ve seen them all,” her text reads. “You’ve seen
one lynched man you’ve seen them all”—the phrase implies that one anonymous victim
can stand for all  the rest;  it’s  the multiplicity of  the atrocity that  matters,  not  the
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individual.  But  the  phrase  also  draws  attention  to  the  common  concern  that,
bombarded with atrocity photographs, present-day viewers can begin to overlook them
or  suffer  from  compassion  fatigue.  Yet,  by  juxtaposing  “I”  and  “you”  in  the
construction of  these  sentences,  Williams aligns  herself  with her  viewers’  potential
indifference and then impels them out of that apathy to participate with her in protest,
to read the rest of her text.
40 ***
41 Just above the wooden frames, Williams’ text reads, “Can you be BLACK and look at
this?,” suggesting that a black viewer will feel particularly horrified and violated by the
image.  Her  question  evokes  that  “primal  narrative,”  that  visceral  feeling  of
identification with the lynching victim and a sense that the terror of lynching persists
in the present. Elizabeth Alexander has written movingly of how black racial identity
has been forged through a collective traumatic memory of  physical  vulnerability,  a
“bottom-line  blackness”  that  can  obscure  class,  regional,  generational,  and  other
differences between African Americans. That memory, which “resides in the flesh,” is
re-activated  by  visual  scenes  of  black  suffering,  a  feeling  echoed  in  “Blowtorch/
Accused/Padlock,” as well as in many black viewers’ responses to Without Sanctuary.54
As Hilton Als wrote in his introduction to the collection, “I felt my neck snap and my
heart break, while looking at these pictures.”55 One African American teacher said of
the collection, “When I look at those pictures... I don’t just see a lifeless body. I look at
those pictures, and I see my son, I see my brother, I see my father. If I’m looking at that
lifeless figure long enough, I see myself.”56 An interactive display at the 2012 exhibition
in Charlotte,  North Carolina,  of  one photograph of  a  mass lynching,  asked visitors,
“Where would you be  in  this  photograph?” and prompted to  them to  record their
answers on Post-It notes to display next to the photograph. Many black viewers wrote
“I  would  be  hanging  from  the  tree.”  In  addition,  as  Als  points  out,  lynching
photographs  remind  black  viewers  of  their  own  objectification  –that  they  are  the
objects of the white gaze, never the subjects of looking. Indeed, historically, the power
of looking at black bodies in pain belonged to whites.57 
42 But what of non-African-American viewers? What of white viewers today? Some black
commentators have assumed that white Americans largely respond to these images
with indifference or even complicity, a generalization that supposes a monolithic white
interpretation. For example, emphasizing the bearing of the past on the present, Hilton
Als intimates that white spectators implicitly identify with the members of the lynch
mob or its white spectators, for, as a black man, he is excruciatingly aware that, to
many whites, he is viewed as a potential criminal, a threat. He has been “lynched by
eyes,” he writes. “It’s that experience of being watched and seeing the harm in people’s
eyes—that is the prelude to becoming a dead nigger,” he tell us.58 It is true that many
white  viewers  are  reluctant  to  draw  those  connections,  in  part  because  time  and
context has led them to feel detached from the unmitigated white supremacy of Jim
Crow America. On their Post-It notes at the Charlotte exhibit, white visitors invariably
wrote that they would be “at home” or “not there,” anywhere but at the scene of the
lynching—a self-serving thought, but probably not true. The emotional impact of the
image—the horror of it—leads them to dis-identify with the white mobs or spectators,
and,  vice  versa,  that  dis-identification  furthers  the  repulsion  they  feel.59 Yet  that
process of dis-identification might also lead them to exaggerate the historical distance
between the lynching and present-day events, to feel that lynching and the racism it
“Somebody do Something!”: Lynching Photographs, Historical Memory, and the Po...
European journal of American studies, 14-4 | 2019
14
represents is safely ensconced in a past reality. They can, in turn, feel comforted by
their own shock and disgust.
43 But what might an ethical  white spectatorship entail,  one that acknowledges white
culpability for past crimes and collective responsibility for present-day injustices? One
alternative might be for white viewers to feel shame as they look at these photographs.
Many  commentators  on  the  Without  Sanctuary website  forum  speak  of  the
“shamefulness” of lynching, or feeling “ashamed” of this past. In doing so, they are
acknowledging a  personal  relationship to  past  atrocities  and even an identification
with the white mobs or spectators. As Courtney Baker has argued, shame can lead to
ethical  action,  as  it  “destabilizes  one’s  comfort  with  oneself”  and  prompts  one  to
reevaluate one’s “social habits.”60 Shame, in fact, was a common response among white
Americans  to  the  increasing  publication  of  lynching  photographs  in  anti-lynching
campaigns and even in mainstream newspapers in the 1920s and 1930s, an emotional
response that led not to the eradication of racist violence, but to its relative invisibility,
as  mobs  could  no  longer  perform  public  lynchings  with  impunity,  and  white
communities  hid  the  signs  and  remnants  of  their  violence,  including  photographs,
away.61 In  that  sense,  shame  can  produce  a  false  reckoning  with  one’s  failings.  As
Martin Berger has written about Civil Rights-era photography, white shame in response
to images of white brutality effected little actual political change. Instead, shame can
work against empathy, as it leads one to focus on the self and one’s own discomfort,
rather than the suffering of others. Rather than work to rectify wrongs, the ashamed
subject seeks to displace blame and to conceal his/her responsibility.62 
44 Others have claimed that looking at atrocity photographs can be a potentially ethical
and redemptive act if  viewers recognize the common bonds of humanity that unite
them with the victims in these images—in particular, what Courtney Baker calls the
“elemental… human condition of vulnerability,” or human suffering. To recognize the
pain of another in this way is to engage in an active form of looking that Baker calls
“humane insight.”63 This insight challenges assumptions that the act of looking is an
intrinsically  objectifying  act  when  the  object  of  the  look  is  “the  other,”  that  is,  a
colonizing gaze that denies the humanity and subjectivity of the sufferer. The risk of
this approach, however, is that the lynching victim’s suffering is universalized in a way
that flattens the historical specificity of racist violence in the US, which can lead to
uncritical approaches to racism. The photographs become iconographic in a different
way, not as symbols of black suffering, but as representations of collective misery or, in
turn, human barbarism. As such, the images become visual citations,  or quotations,
through which we can conceptualize any present-day or future atrocity.64 Some viewers
of Without Sanctuary, for instance, drew analogies between lynching and terrorism after
9/11, homophobic violence, or anti-Arab violence, or between lynching photographs
and the images of Abu Ghraib prisoners.65 The “primal narrative” of lynching, in this
sense, is an elastic one which can be deployed for multiple purposes and with varying
degrees  of  complexity.66 This  form  of  insight  risks  decontextualizing  the  lynching
victim to the point that the long history of black subjugation and white supremacy is
obscured altogether, and there is no white reckoning with that past—which is why Life
’s inclusion of the Duck Hill photograph in its Family of Man photo-essay appears so
jarring to us now.67 These uses ultimately can do a disservice to historical memory,
contributing to a harmful misremembering that can create a kind of visual exploitation
of the lynched body. 
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45 It is possible, though, for white viewers to engage in “humane insight” while, at the
same  time,  acknowledging  the  racial  particularity  of  black  suffering  rooted  in  the
histories  of  slavery  and  Jim  Crow.  Such  an  insight  must  feel  a  shared  human
vulnerability,  a  physical  connection  with  others,  while  at  the  same  recognizing
differences in subjective experiences between self  and other,  differences contingent
upon social position and one’s relationship to history. That is, one can feel the suffering
of  another,  approximately,  while  also  knowing  that  one  is  not  actually  feeling  it.
Sympathy,  in  this  regard,  serves  as  a  more  useful  term  than  empathy.  It  can  be
unethical to empathize in the sense of placing oneself in the position of others when
one cannot possibly experience their suffering; to do so can deny one’s own relative
position  of  security.  Sympathy,  however,  connotes  feeling  alongside  with  rather  in
place of. 
46 Sympathy—and its  cousin,  compassion—have been critiqued as emotions laden with
value judgments and implied hierarchies. They emerged in the seventeenth century to
connote the feeling of placing oneself in the experience of another, and were viewed by
Enlightenment thinkers such as David Hume and Adam Smith as essential for moral
thinking and ethical action.68 By the nineteenth century, sympathy lay at the heart of
sentimental humanitarianism, or the idea that what united humanity, and the human
and animal world, was not intellect or reason, but its shared capacity to feel pain. Since
sentimentalism was the province of middle-class and elite white Euro-Americans, of
those who had the time and comfort, or the detachment from suffering, to suffer on
behalf of others, it came to be associated with class and racial privilege. Sympathy soon
connoted pity, the emotion of feeling for someone below one’s station, rather than a
feeling of shared pain among equals. In the twentieth century, psychologists replaced
sympathy with empathy, from the German word “einfuhling,” meaning to “feel into,”
which involves a process of imitation or simulation, of experiencing another’s feelings
as one’s own by projecting one’s own feelings into the experience of another.69 Feminist
and postcolonial scholars, however, have come to critique empathy, since it presumes
that people respond to the same suffering in the same way, without acknowledging
differences in historical or social experience and power. Empathy can also potentially
obscure or erase the voices of marginalized groups. Indeed, the problem with “bearing
witness” is that the witness, by implication, is granted authority to speak for another.
In short, empathy recreates the same hierarchies that sympathy came to denote.70
47 In this light, sympathy and compassion warrant a resurrection, if we remember their
etymological  roots  denoting  both  suffering  (pathos/passion)  and  with  (sym/com).
Pathos involves an intensity of response that is both emotional and visceral, rooted in
the original dual association of pathos with passion and passivity. While today we tend
to understand passion as an intense, positive feeling toward an object, the word still
retains an earlier notion of being acted upon, for instance, when we describe feeling
passionate as being captivated or taken by something. In feeling pathos, then, one is
reminded of  one’s  physical  vulnerability—one’s  passivity,  the feeling of  being acted
upon—for grief  or  repulsion are bodily reactions as  much as they are feelings.  Our
pathos thus forces a connection to the external world, which, when we are horrified,
shocked, or saddened, has penetrated our subjective isolation. That loss of boundaries
around  the  self  and  that  awareness  of  the  external  world  creates  a  new  form  of
knowing which connects us to others. In that way, sympathy, unlike empathy, does not
connote feeling the same as others or speaking from their position; rather, it suggests a
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looser connectivity, an approximation of fellow feeling, but a fellowship nonetheless.
As Dorota Golanska has argued, this is what happens when we encounter the trauma of
others.  We can feel sympathy with others only when we feel our own vulnerability
through an affective response to their suffering. But unlike empathy, that response
acknowledges the differences between one’s own position and that of the other. One
feels, not in place of another, but alongside the other. In this sense, to witness is not to
speak for another, but instead, implies that one has a connected, albeit not identical,
experience of a traumatic event with another.71 
48 Works of art can serve as critical objects to prompt a sympathetic response to trauma,
since a function of art is to generate emotional responses and change perceptions, and
art makes and conveys meaning through the sensations that it produces. Art can, in
that way, enable emotional connections to others.72 Indeed, “einfuhling” was first used
in reference to aesthetics in the 1870s, to conceptualize how people experience art and,
through art, come to feel the perspectives and mental states of others. Just as we can
“feel into” or simulate the feelings of others, we can experience the properties of art as
our  own  because  they  produce  affective  reactions  in  us,  much  as  the  physical
expressions or movements of other people can.73 Scholars of trauma have understood
memorial art or memorial sites as functioning in a similar way. In encountering the
suffering of  others  through art,  the viewer experiences a  milder or  muted form of
trauma.74 
49 Atrocity  photographs  could  intensify  a  sympathetic  response  since,  due  to  their
documentary realism, they create a virtual or mediated experience; one is in the scene,
as  a  witness  to  the  victim’s  suffering,  while,  at  the  same  time,  aware  that  is  one
removed from the scene. Indeed, we are moved toward a sympathetic response to the
suffering in a photograph when we recognize the image as a representation of atrocity,
rather  than as  a  transparent  reflection of  a  reality.75 “Accused/Blowtorch/Padlock”
successfully makes viewers aware of the representational nature of the image through
the way Williams breaks up the image and frames it, as well as through her text.
50 To  understand  this  emotive  effect  of  atrocity  images,  however,  is  to  disrupt  the
emphasis we place on the visual authority of the photograph. That authority derived
from a western ocular-centrism, which focused on the visual as the primary source of
knowledge. We know this atrocity happened because we can see it. Instead, if we focus
on  the  photograph’s  emotive  power,  the  body  becomes  the  primary  vehicle  for
knowledge;  we  know  the  suffering  of  the  victim because  we  ourselves  feel  an
approximation of  it  in  our  affective  reaction to  the image.76 This  is  what  Elizabeth
Alexander  means  when  she  says  that  black  memory  “resides  in  the  flesh”  and  is
activated by witnessing scenes of black suffering. But white sympathy, even without
the same racial identification, can also “reside in the flesh,” though horror, disgust, and
heartache, and spur an ethical engagement with historical memory. Of course, as has
been shown, that affective response is conditioned not by the photograph itself, but by
the context in which it is viewed, the text and framing, and the knowledge viewers
bring  to  their  encounter  with  the  image,  including  references  to  other  images.
Williams’ texts guides viewers toward a specific affective response through her framing
of  the  image  and  the  accompanying  self-reflexive  text.  By  commenting  on  her
spectatorship of the photograph, she compels us to feel the pain of her encounter with
the lynching photograph and to recognize our own spectatorship at the same time.
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51 The first exhibition of Without Sanctuary in the Ruth Horowitz Gallery in New York was
criticized for its un-reflective and voyeuristic display of the photographs, which were
exhibited on blank, white walls, without explanatory text beyond simple captioning.
Subsequent exhibitions of the Without Sanctuary collection responded to these critiques
by  providing  more  context,  including  content  about  anti-lynching  activism—all  of
which was meant to circumscribe viewers’ responses to the images. These exhibits also
sought to foster a self-reflexive spectatorship, drawing attention to the representation
of the images as historical documents, rather than as transparent windows into the
past, through interactive questions and through the exhibit design itself.77 For instance,
cut-outs in the walls compelled viewers to watch each other view the photographs,
creating an unsettling awareness of their own spectatorship. The effect was to foster a
sympathetic engagement with the photographs.
52 Sympathy, because it involves a turn away from the self and toward a connection with
others,  is  a  precondition for ethical  action.  This  view also rests  on the theory that
emotions  are  relational,  that  is,  they  are  felt  toward  something  or  someone  and
promote connection to others. They are also expressive or performative in the sense
that they generate effects– including a new knowledge of the world and a sense of
responsibility for it.78 This effect is what can lead Williams to scrawl “Somebody do
Something!” beside a photograph of a lynching from fifty years ago and compel viewers
to want to intervene. 
53 ***
54 Viewers’  subjective relationship to the past atrocity will  also shape their encounter
with its representation. As noted above, black and white viewers encounter lynching
photographs in palpably different ways. Yet, in my analysis of “Accused/Blowtorch/
Padlock,” I have used the language of a single “viewer,” or “we,” as if there could be
one  definitive  encounter  with  the  piece,  because  it  itself  directs  viewers  toward  a
specific interpretation. The success of a piece like “Accused/Padlock/Blowtorch” is that
it compels all viewers to take Williams’ point of view as a black woman, to sympathize
with her pain– and to bear witness to it. In that sense, to have an ethical encounter
with lynching photographs is to understand them as both historical and not historical
at the same time. Indeed, the erasure of historical particularity is not an unfortunate
byproduct  of  historical  memory;  it  is  exactly  how  historical  memory  functions
effectively. Our encounter with “Accused/Padlock/Blowtorch,” which itself collapses
past and present and compels us to interpret McDaniels’ torture as ongoing, testifies to
this process. In my analysis, I have used the present tense, just as Williams does; there
is no other tense to use, as memory is not about the past but the present.
55 In this light, it is not coincidental that so many protests in the aftermath of high-profile
murders  of  African  Americans  at  the  hands  of  police  in  the  past  few  years  have
involved a  pointed,  sympathetic  identification with  the  victims.  In  response  to  the
death of Eric Garner in 2014, “I Can’t Breathe” was printed on posters and t-shirts—
Garner’s final words, heard on the digital recording of his murder, as the police put him
in the chokehold that killed him. “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot” became a protest refrain in
the aftermath of Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014. “I am Trayvon”
was plastered on hoodies and placards after the 2012 murder of Trayvon Martin, as was
“I am Sandra Bland” after the mysterious death of Bland, held in custody after an arrest
for a traffic violation in 2015. 
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56 The effect of this sympathetic identification is to press the point that the racial climate
in the U.S., both past and present, indicts all African Americans as potential criminals—
and that this  indictment is  a  form of oppression that affects every black person in
America. “We Can’t Breathe.” “This could be me—I could be Trayvon. I could be gunned
down in the street.” This identification also highlights the innocence of the victims of
police brutality. The right-wing media quickly tried to draw attention to their criminal
pasts, to subvert the narrative that these were guiltless people, killed for no reason. In
creating  an  identification  between  themselves  and  these  victims,  protesters  are
undermining this counter-narrative. 
57 It  is  also  an  identification  steeped  in  historical  memory.  For  African  Americans  to
embrace  these  memes  aligns  with  Alexander’s  conception  of  black  social  memory.
Alexander wrote in 1995 that the video of Los Angeles police officers beating Rodney
King  “activated”  collective  black  identity,  rooted  in  memories  of  black  suffering,
leading black viewers to feel themselves “implicated” in King’s fate.79 Williams had the
same  affective  response  to  the  lynching  of  Bootjack  McDaniels.  Something  similar
happened when video footage of police killings—of Garner, Philando Castile, and others
—appeared  across  the  internet  and  on  television  news  in  the  past  five  years.  As
happened with high-profile killings in the 1980s, the murders were likened to “legal
lynchings,” the videos to lynching photographs. As Koritha Mitchell has written, “these
videos often end up making a statement very similar to that conveyed by lynching
photographs: This can be done to people of color because they are not true citizens” (emphasis
in  original).80 Commentators  on  the  Without  Sanctuary website  forum  have  drawn
similar connections. 
58 But the historical  memory of  lynching may also prompt white viewers to interpret
present-day images of police brutality against African-Americans sympathetically. In
response to these images, Mitchell has lamented that “watching the brutalization of
people  of  color  fails  to  inspire  empathy”  in  many white  Americans.81 Yet  lynching
photographs can create a historical context through which white viewers can interpret
present-day acts  of  racist  violence.  As  one teacher posted on the Without  Sanctuary
website forum: “I’ve been trying to get my class of 12th graders, all white, to understand
the underlying reasons for the protests [against police killings.]… I had the constant
sense that I was not making any headway. I showed them this [site] today. They left
class  in  stunned  silence,  their  heads  bowed.  I  think  today  I  finally  started  to  get
through to them.”82 What’s more, perhaps surprisingly, a good number of white people
were photographed wearing “I  am Trayvon Martin”  hoodies  or  carrying “We Can’t
Breathe”  signs.  At  first  glance,  this  is  an  offensive  identification,  as  they  appear
ignorant  and  unfeeling  about  their  advantaged  social  position  as  white  persons  in
America.  But  it’s  hard  to  imagine  that  any  white  person who would  wear  a  “I  am
Trayvon Martin” hoodie or who would carry a “We Can’t Breathe” sign would not know
this. Instead, their identification could be read as clumsy attempts to grapple with their
affective  response  to  the  brutality  they  have  witnessed,  to  mistake  sympathy  for
empathy. This response, nevertheless, prompted them take some sort of ethical action
—to do something—in this case, to protest.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper traces the history of one specific photograph and its exhibition over time from the
1930s through the 1980s: that of the lynching of ‘Bootjack’ McDaniels, tortured to death by a
white mob in Duck Hill, Mississippi, in 1937. I use that history to reflect more broadly on how
lynching  photographs  have  shaped  popular  consciousness  about  racist  violence  at  different
moments in time. They are able to do so, in good part, because of their iconographic qualities.
These photographs, like many historical photographs, tend to detach past events from historical
specificity and, subsequently, render the past into symbolic form, which allows new meanings to
be imposed on them through the text and context that surround them. Those new meanings can
direct viewers’ emotional responses to the images. This process of recontextualization allows for
a meaningful ethical engagement with both historical and present-day suffering. In these ways,
lynching  photographs  have  been  crucial  to  the  formation  of  black  historical  memories  of
violence and injustice in the United States. Through this same process of recontextualization, I
argue, lynching photographs make it possible for white Americans to engage ethically with racist
violence,  in the past  and the present,  through what I  call  “sympathetic  spectatorship,” –  an
emotionally empathic form of looking that also involves an awareness of social difference. 
INDEX
Keywords: Lynching, photographs, Without Sanctuary, Pat Ward Williams, Robert McDaniels,
historical memory, sympathy, bearing witness
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